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Po l i c y  Re s e a R c h Wo R k i n g  Pa P e R 4446
Can perceptions data help us understand investment 
climate constraints facing the private sector?  Or do firms 
simply complain about everything?  
   In this paper, the authors provide a picture of how 
firms’ views on constraints differ across countries in 
Sub-Saharan Africa.  Using the World Bank’s Enterprise 
Surveys database, they find that reported constraints 
reflect country characteristics and vary systematically 
by level of income—the most elemental constraints 
to doing business (power, access to finance, ability to 
plan ahead) appear to be most binding at low levels 
of income. As countries develop and these elemental 
constraints are relaxed, governance-related constraints 
become more problematic. As countries move further 
up the income scale and the state becomes more 
capable, labor regulation is perceived to be more of a 
problem—business is just one among several important 
constituencies.  
   The authors also consider whether firm-level 
characteristics—such as size, ownership, exporter status, 
and firms’ own experience—affect firms’ views on the 
severity of constraints. They find that, net of country and 
This paper—a product of the Development Economics Vice Presidency—is part of a larger effort in the department to 
understand the determinacy of private sector development. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web 
at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at agelb@worldbank.org.
sector fixed effects and firm characteristics, firms’ views 
do reflect their experience as evidenced by responses to 
other questions in surveys. The results suggest that there 
are both country-level and firm-level variations in the 
investment climate.  
   Turning to the concept of “binding constraints,” the 
Enterprise Surveys do not generally suggest one single 
binding constraint facing firms in difficult business 
climates. However, there do appear to be groups of 
constraints that matter more at different income levels, 
with a few elemental constraints being especially 
important at low levels and a few regulatory constraints 
at high levels, but a difficult range of governance-
related constraints at intermediate levels.  Adjusting 
to a constraint does not mean that firms then do not 
recognize it—for example, generator-owning firms are 
not distinguishable from other firms when ranking 
electricity as a constraint. Overall, firms do appear to 
discriminate between constraints in a reasonable way.  
Their views can provide a useful first step in the business-
government consultative process and help in prioritizing 
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I  Introduction: Firm Perceptions of the Investment Climate 
 
In common with many other surveys, the Enterprise Surveys conducted by the World 
Bank collect both quantitative data on firm performance and perceptions-based data on 
the severity of a number of potential constraints facing the firm.  Perceptions-based data 
are sometimes used in economic analysis, but there has been some debate on their value 
for assessing constraints.  Firms’ benchmarks may differ by country—much as a poor 
family in a country belonging to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development may feel “poorer” than a more deprived one in a low-income country, a 
firm in South Africa may see corruption as a more serious problem than a firm in, say, 
Nigeria even if corruption is more endemic in the latter country. Benchmarks may be 
influenced by waves of pessimism and euphoria reflecting adverse or favorable trends.  
Since firms and entrepreneurs enter and exit in response to opportunities and constraints, 
they are endogenous to the investment climate and their opinions may not accurately 
reflect the severity of constraints as perceived by potential or discouraged entrants.   
 
How seriously a firm rates a particular “external” investment climate constraint could 
also be influenced by its severity relative to other constraints.  Whether studies should 
rate or rank constraints is a live issue, particularly in the light of efforts to find the 
“binding constraint” to growth (Hausmann, Rodrik, and Velasco, 2005).  Firms may not 
recognize the origin of their problems—for example, slow customs clearance could 
reflect an “external” difficulty (corruption, slow procedures) or factors internal to the 
firm (an inability to provide proper documentation).  
 
Despite these shortcomings, views on the severity of investment climate constraints are 
widely used to frame priorities for reforms and investments.  They are increasingly 
complemented by “Doing Business” indicators based on expert surveys (Doing Business, 
2004-07).   The latter provide a more comparable cross-country perspective across a 
detailed range of regulation, but not a firm-level view of the de facto severity of 
regulatory and infrastructural obstacles.  In principle, such approaches are   3
complementary, but combining approaches is only valuable if each supplies useful 
information.   
 
The objective of this paper is therefore to provide an initial analysis of firms’ perceptions 
of constraints on the business climate, as reported across a number of the World Bank’s 
Enterprise Surveys, with special emphasis on Africa.
1  How does the reported severity of 
these constraints compare across countries and across different types of constraints, such 
as macroeconomic management and governance, regulation, factor markets and 
infrastructure?   Does the probability that a firm rates a constraint as serious appear to 
vary systematically by type of firm as well as across countries?  Do firms’ ratings 
conform to patterns expected from other survey data, where available?  Do the cross-
country patterns confirm to other cross-country evidence?   
 
In this paper, we look at perceptions of firms regarding the investment climate across 
twenty-six African countries where similar questions have been included—Burundi, 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Malawi, Guinea-Bissau, Eritrea, Uganda, 
Gambia, Madagascar, Mozambique, Tanzania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Zambia, Benin, 
Kenya, Mauritania, Senegal, Lesotho, Angola, Cape Verde, Swaziland, Namibia, South 
Africa, Mauritius, and Botswana—in surveys encompassing almost five thousand firms.  
The Enterprise Surveys were carried out between 2002 and 2006 by the Africa Private 
Sector Group of the World Bank.   
 
In Section II we review some existing literature on firm perceptions, including studies 
bearing on the choice of whether to ask firms to rank or to rate constraints. Section III 
provides a picture of how views on constraints differ across countries, and also considers 
whether cross-country perception patterns are reasonably consistent with other data.  
Section IV shifts towards firm-level analysis--we offer a simple conceptual model of 
firms’ responses and test this using Probit regressions, to see whether factors such as size, 
                                                 
1 More information on the World Bank’s Enterprise Surveys can be found at www.enterprisesurveys.org. 
These surveys are also sometimes referred to as the World Bank’s Investment Climate Surveys or ICA 
data. 
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ownership and exporter status drive firm perceptions as expected.  We also test whether 
firms’ views actually reflect their experience, as evidenced by responses to other 
questions in surveys.  Section V concludes.   
 
 
II What Do Perceptions Tell Us?  A Review of the Literature 
 
 
2.1  Rankings versus Ratings 
 
Any study of perception-based data needs to start off with a clear understanding of what 
is being measured.   As shown by many studies, including those referenced in Iarossi 
(2006), responses are sensitive to how the question is framed.  One debate is whether 
ratings or rankings are preferable for measuring “values” or other opinion-based 
variables.  Alwin and Krosnick (1987) find that rating and ranking choices can produce 
different results, but that the difference is eliminated when “non-discriminating” 
respondents—that is, those who rate most items similarly are removed from the sample.  
To reduce the incidence of low discrimination, McCarty and Shrum (2000) suggest that 
first asking respondents to pick their least and most important values, and then to rate all 
values provides more robust differentiation than using rankings alone.  Alwin and 
Krosnick (1985) also analyze comparisons of ranking and rating. They conclude that 
ranking may be preferred as forcing stronger expression and relationships.  But they 
include an important caveat—forcing a ranking may induce spurious differentiation for 
respondents who genuinely do not have major preferences among different choices.  One 
way of interpreting this literature is that, while the choice of ranking and rating will 
depend on the precise question at hand, elements of ranking and rating may need to be 
combined to allow responses that are less constrained yet discriminating.  
 
This has implications for investment climate analyses which usually include coverage of 
many potential constraints.  Whether a single “binding constraint” exists is an empirical 
question.  In this case, rating would therefore seem preferable, to allow responses to 
reflect an essential degree of flexibility.  In addition, simply asking firms to rank 
constraints provides no information on whether the top-ranked constraint is serious or   5
not.  But what is the benchmark against which firms in a given country are expected to 
rate the severity of a particular constraint?   Except possibly for multinationals active in 
many economies, firms will have no “absolute” scale against which the effect of 
individual constraints can be assessed.  Further, any simple quantitative criterion (how 
much could sales increase if a particular constraint is relaxed?) can mislead in cases 
where constraints bind firms simultaneously.  In such cases, even if all constraints 
together are important, no one constraint may be important on its own, and we might 
expect to see a cluster of constraints identified.   
 
There is no simple answer to such questions.  Firms’ responses are likely to embody a 
blend of rating and rankings—constraints will be stressed if seen as seriously 
problematic, and particularly if seen as serious relative to other constraints experienced 
by the firm.  To help firms discriminate in this way, without forcing an absolute ranking, 
the procedure advocated by McCarty and Shrum seems the most appropriate.  First 
introduce a “showcard” with all alternatives to help firms to consider the most and least 
important ones, then ask for ratings.  The Enterprise Surveys discussed below do not 
formally use the showcard method.  However, we understand that in practice managers 
are usually informed about the list of constraints before being asked to rate their 
importance, so that the procedure in general conforms to the McCarty-Shrum 
recommendation.
2    
 
Another important issue raised by Iarossi (2006) and others concerns the ordering of 
alternatives.  This has been shown by studies to potentially influence responses.  One 
approach to this problem could be to randomize the order of options.  This is not done in 
the ICA surveys; however, the ordering of the options is the same across all countries, so 
that differences in response cannot be ascribed to order changes.  Finally, Bourguignon 
(2006) notes the importance of distinguishing between the perception of a constraint and 
the impact on performance if this constraint is relaxed. This bears on how the question 
should be framed and the importance of confirming opinion-based indicators with 
                                                 
2 From discussions with World Bank staff fielding survey instruments, it is clear that in some cases, 
enumerators are instructed to show managers the entire list.  In other case, they may do so anyway in order 
to speed up the response process.   6
behavioral evidence.  The present paper does not go as far as this, but focuses on the 
factors shaping the opinions and what they suggest about investment climate priorities in 
Africa.   
 
2.2  Some Previous Studies 
 
Most firm surveys request qualitative views on aspects of the investment climate, but few 
studies provide cross-country information comparing their patterns and their relationships 
with “objective” constraints.  Two of the few are Hellman et al (2000), and Fries, 
Lysenko and Polanec (2003), which use BEEPS (Business Environment and Enterprise 
Performance) data to assess changes in the business climate across a number of countries 
in Central and Eastern Europe.  The former paper focuses on governance, corruption and 
state capture.  Among other results, it concludes that there is little evidence pointing to 
“country perception bias” associated with the use of different benchmarks.  The latter 
paper concludes that qualitative measures of the business environment appear to provide 
reasonably accurate measures of its quality and of changes over time.  It also shows 
relationships between these qualitative measures and quantitative behavioral variables, 
such as firms’ investment and growth rates.  
 
The question of whether firms’ perceptions of the severity of constraints is reflected in 
actual behavior is  more contentious however, particularly in the area of finance.  
Ayyagari, Demirguc-Kunt and Maximovic (2006) assess evidence on the severity of 
constraints from the World Business Environment survey on firm-specific sales growth 
rates.  They find considerable differences between the relative severity of constraints as 
described by firms and the factors that appear to be most correlated with differences in 
growth.  In particular, recent growth rates appeared to be strongly influenced by whether 
firms considered access to finance as a serious constraint even when finance was not 
widely identified as a key binding constraint.  Some analysts have argued the converse.  
Although access to credit is often flagged by firm managers as a constraint in African 
surveys, Teal, (1998), Swamy and Raturi (1999) and others suggest that evidence does 
not support the argument that limited credit is the main reason why firms are not   7
investing more in their own operations, even though some firms may be credit 
constrained.  This could be because marginal returns to investment are well below the 
average and therefore act as a disincentive to expansion, even when firms have retained 
earnings.   
 
A recent, comprehensive paper on firm perceptions looks at the issue of finance as well 
as several other key components of the investment climate across a very large set of 
countries (Carlin, Schaeffer and Seabright, 2006).  Carlin et. al. find that small firms 
complain about finance while large firms complain about almost everything else.  Their 
result raises an interesting question—if small firms’ concerns about finance are not 
related to their actual credit constraints, could it be the case that large firms’ perceptions 
are spurious as well?  In particular, are large firms complaining about actual constraints 
or are they complaining about other things because they do not have a problem with 
access to finance?  We approach this issue in our econometric analysis, by looking at the 
pairwise correlations between firm perceptions and quantitative measures of the 
investment climate, across small, medium and large firms in our data sample. 
 
In an overview of subjective data that relies on a wide range of empirical literature, 
Bertrand and Mullainathan argue that subjective data must be treated with skepticism 
(Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2006).  They argue that subjective data should not generally 
be used as dependent variables because of a host of problems related to measurement 
errors.  But they also note that these data can be used as explanatory variables as long as 
caution is exercised with regard to causality.  The authors also argue that changes in 
answers to questions do not appear to be useful in explaining corresponding changes in 
behavior, based on their review of studies conducted in the U.S.   
 
In our analysis, although we consider correlations between subjective and objective 
measures, we do not yet have panel data and are as yet unable to assess whether these 
correlations are the same or different over time.   
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III   Constraints in Enterprise Surveys 
 
3.1  Country Profiles and Country-Level Differences in Firm Perceptions 
 
Many Enterprise Surveys ask firms the following question, with answers ranging from 
No Obstacle to Very Severe:   
 
Do you think that the following present any obstacle to the current operations of your 
establishment?  
1 Telecommunications        
2 Electricity        
3 Transportation        
4  Access to Land      
5 Tax  Rates        
6 Tax  Administration      Obstacle 
7  Customs and Trade Regulations      No Obstacle  1
8  Functioning of the Courts      Minor Obstacle  2
9 Labor  Regulations      Moderate  3
10 Inadequately  Educated  Workforce      Major Obstacle  4
11  Business Licensing and Permits      Very Severe  5
12  Access to Finance (availability and cost)        
13  Political Instability          
14 Macroeconomic  Instability        
15 Corruption        
16  Crime, Theft and Disorder        
17  Practices of competitors informal sector        
 
 
   9
We begin our analysis by looking at five constraints—electricity, access to finance, 
corruption, macro-instability, and labor regulations—which are fairly representative of 
the range of infrastructure, factor-market, governance and regulatory constraints that 
firms typically face.   We also widen our analysis, as we go along, to consider a slightly 
larger set of constraints that are related to the five mentioned above. 
 











Low Income                   
Burundi   100.0  79.10 14.93 67.91 47.01  2.24
DRC   120.0  84.78 15.22 67.39 63.59  16.85
Ethiopia   160.0  42.45 39.00 42.82 35.28  4.57
Malawi 160.0  60.51 46.79 42.04 75.80  12.74
Guinea-Bissau   180.0  73.77 29.51 86.89 54.10  4.92
Eritrea   220.0  36.76 1.52 54.39 80.88  5.8
Uganda   280.0  87.63 20.97 62.90 21.51  1.61
Gambia   290.0  72.95 14.75 68.03 27.05  3.28
Madagascar   290.0  41.72 45.99 59.06 64.71  14.98
Mozambique   310.0  64.02 63.74          79.33 62.84  38.25
Tanzania   340.0  57.92 50.97 49.03 42.86  12.26
Mali   380.0  22.56 49.25 56.49 11.81  3.73
Burkina Faso   400.0  68.63 54.90 76.47 35.29  17.65
Lower Middle Income                   
Zambia   490.0  37.71 47.70 54.60 76.00  17.14
Benin   510.0  69.02 85.08 74.32 49.71  36.41
Kenya   530.0  48.22 74.41 44.31 52.80  22.87
Mauritania   560.0  46.51 27.91 53.49 18.60  8.14
Senegal   710.0  31.65 40.43 55.98 26.50  14.89
Lesotho   960.0  35.62 36.11 39.44 40.00  17.57
Angola   1350.0  62.03 35.44 62.45 24.05  13.5
Cape Verde   1870.0  70.45 13.64 47.73 13.64  13.64
Upper Middle Income                   
Swaziland   2280.0  18.09 27.66 36.17 15.96  13.83
Namibia   2990.0  13.04 25.55 36.33 24.64  14.49
South Africa   4960.0  9.28 16.32 12.89 33.51  33.39
Botswana   5180.0  9.38 25.78 42.19 35.16  10.16
Mauritius 5260.0  13.00 36.73 33.33 39.70  28.14
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Table 1 shows the percentage of firms ranking each of these constraints to be major or 
severe, in the twenty six countries used in this analysis.
3  Figures 1a-1c shows spider 
charts with the percentages of firms rating constraints as major or severe across three 
income groups.  These suggest a pattern, with constraints such as power and finance 
dominating at low levels, corruption becoming a more serious problem at middle levels, 
and a decline in perceived problems at high levels except for labor regulation.   
 
Figure 1a: 
Percentage of Firms Ranking a Constraint as Major or Severe  





                                                 
3 Additional calculations available from the authors show the perceptions of firms with regard to the five 
constraints for individual countries, as well as the results for all constraints, by country and by aggregated 
groups.     11
Figure 1b 
Percentage of Firms Ranking a Constraint as Major or Severe 




Percentage of Firms Ranking a Constraint as Major or Severe 





To illustrate the evolution of constraints in a more dynamic way, Figures 2a-2c show 
three sets of constraint perceptions by income, together with fitted polynomial trend-
lines.    Figure 2a shows the set of constraints that decrease in perceived severity with 
income.  Of primary concern is electricity—almost 70 percent of African firms at the   12
lowest end of the income scale complain about the lack of power or unreliable power.  
Also important in this class are macroeconomic instability and access to finance.  Of 
lesser importance but still declining in severity with income is access to land.  Since 
Africa is land-rich, this does not reflect actual scarcity in a physical sense; rather it refers 
to shortages of serviced, industrial premises, which tend to be closely associated with 
deficient infrastructure.  Power, finance, land and the ability to plan are basic 
requirements for a dynamic business; we therefore term these elemental constraints.  
 
Figure 2b shows the set of constraints that appear to be particularly problematic for  firms 
in the middle of our income range.  These include corruption, tax rates and 
administration, and crime.  Concerns about corruption follow a path similar to concerns 
about taxes and crime, but with a slight lag—it is as if firms take a little longer to be 
convinced that corruption is decreasing.   These constraints tend to be related to the 
quality of governance and state effectiveness.  
  
Figure 2c shows the set of constraints that peak at the upper end of the income scale--
labor regulations and skill shortages.  These problems tend to be perceived as more 
serious once the basic elements are present for the firm to do business, and once the most 
pressing governance-related problems are attenuated by improvements in state capacity.  
They reflect the need for skilled labor, especially in more sophisticated economies—as 
noted below, skills shortages are seen as more serious than labor regulations in almost all 
countries in the sample.   They also reflect the fact that, as the regulatory capacity of the 
state strengthens, business will be but one constituency among many, and that it will need 
to compete with other interests, including organized labor and possibly environmental 
and other constituencies.  These impediments to business are more likely to be of a policy 
nature rather than related to infrastructure or governance.   
   13
Figure 2a:   
Percentage of Firms Ranking the Constraint as Major or Severe by GDP/capita—


























































































































































































































































































































































     Figure 2b: 
Percentage of Firms Ranking the Constraint as Major or Severe by GDP/capita—
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Figure 2c:  
Percentage of Firms Ranking the Constraint as Major or Severe by GDP/capita—
















































































































































































































































































































































Figures 2a-2c suggest an approach to classifying constraints and the way in which firm’s 
perceptions of their difficulties are likely to vary with income level. At the low end of the 
scale, manufacturing firms are most likely to be concerned about the most basic  
constraints to doing business.  Is there a reliable power supply?  Can finance and 
premises be secured?  Can the firm plan ahead, or does macroeconomic instability make 
this impossible?  In some countries, individual constraints can be at a level where they 
can be considered as truly binding.  Electricity tariffs in Uganda would have to increase 
to almost $ 0.29 per kWh if the consumer were to bear the full costs of electricity 
including the expensive thermal generation used in attempts to plug capacity gaps.  The 
cost of load shedding to the economy is significant, and expensive back-up generation 
has impacted the competitiveness of industrial production.  The cost of un-served energy 
has been estimated at about US$0.39 per kWh excluding multiplier effects
4.   Not 
surprisingly, 87% of Ugandan forms considered electricity as a major or severe constraint 
in 2006.  These constraints do not die away completely as the business climate 
                                                 
4 Power Planning Associates, 2007.   15
improves—in South Africa, for example, macroeconomic instability is rated as a serious 
problem by many exporters, concerned about the volatility of the Rand.  But their relative 
importance declines once these basic requirements for doing business are established. 
 
Moving up the scale to lower-middle-income, firms must confront a number of problems 
caused by weak governance and low administrative and bureaucratic capacity.  These 
include the tax system (rates and administration), corruption and the control of crime and 
violence.   Poor governance may, of course, be responsible for some of the elemental 
constraints (corruption means that investments in power generation do not go ahead) but 
the firms do not experience these effects directly.  Some aspects of regulation will be less 
troubling to firms in these settings—even if labor laws are stringent, the weak capacity of 
the state to enforce them means that they are less likely to be perceived as a serious 
problem.  
 
Moving further up to middle-income, unless higher income is due to “exogenous” factors 
such as large rents from oil and gas, the state tends to be more capable of enforcing 
regulations.  Civil society may become better organized, and checks and balances 
stronger, causing corruption to be less of a serious problem. Concerns about 
infrastructure, access to finance, and access to land also decrease considerably; even 
concerns about crime fall off relative to perceived difficulties in the “low-middle” 
category.  But business will not be the only constituency--labor is also exercising its 
voice.  Policies become more serious determinants of the business climate at this stage, 
largely because the state has stronger capacity to implement them. 
 
The shortage of skilled labor is regarded as a more serious constraint than labor 
regulations over the entire spectrum of countries.  While it is more frequently cited in the 
higher income group of countries, this does not prove that the skills constraint is actually 
more serious.  Skills may be cited because concerns over many of the other constraints 
have declined to low levels.  However, within individual economies, it is also the case 
that larger and more technically advanced firms express greater concerns over labor skills 
than smaller, low-productivity firms (see discussion below, in Table 3), and this provides   16
some support to the proposition that skills shortages become more acute constraints in 
relatively sophisticated, high-productivity, economies.   
 
3.2  Country Profiles and Other Country-Level Indicators. 
 
 
Having developed a picture of how constraints are perceived to bind at different levels of 
income, we consider whether the incidence of complaints aligns with cross-country 
indicators of the business environment.  Table 2 contains a summary of some 
comparisons, first with a number of macroeconomic and survey-based indicators and then 
with several Doing Business (DB) indicators.  
 
From Table 2, the intensity of perceived constraints is reasonably well-correlated with a 
number of country-level indicators.  Considering first the six macroeconomic and survey-
based indicators, there is a close relationship between firms’ perceptions of the severity 
of the electricity constraint and an indicator of estimated losses due to power outages 
(which is also taken from the Enterprise Surveys).  Firm perceptions of corruption are 
significantly correlated with the WorldWide Governance Indicator (formerly Kaufmann-
Kraay Indicator) measure of corruption at the country level.  Concern over access to 
finance is very strongly correlated with macro-level indicators, being less frequent in 
countries with financial depth as measured by high ratios of private credit/GDP and with 
higher Institutional Investor ratings.  Concern over the cost of finance is strongly 
correlated with country-level interest-rate measures.  In areas where the linkage could be 
considered as less direct –for example, between concern over macroeconomic instability 
and measures of government effectiveness, the relationship is not significant but is of 
expected sign.     17
Table 2: Correlations between Firm Perceptions and External Data  
Perception Area (Enterprise Survey Data 
and Selected Comparators) 
Pearson’s Correlation Coefficient 
(P>|r|) 
Electricity  Sales Lost due to Power Outages (Surveys) 
0.39**        (0.05) 
Corruption  Control of Corruption (KK) 
-0.35*         (0.08) 
Access to Finance  Domestic Credit to the Private Sector  (IMF) 
(% of GDP, 2004) 
-0.89***       (0.01) 
Access to Finance  Investor Rating  (Institutional Investor) 
-0.80***        (0.01) 
Cost of Finance  Interest Rate  (IMF) 
0.72***         (0.01) 
Macroeconomic Instability  Government Effectiveness  (Kaufmann Kray)) 
-0.28             (0.17) 
  
Business Licensing  Days to Get a License  (DB) 
0.41**           (0.04) 
Business Licensing  Number of Licensing Procedures  (Doing 
Business) 
-0.01              (0.96) 
Economic Instability  Strength of Legal Rights Index  (DB) 
-0.01              (0.95) 
Corruption  Strength of Legal Rights Index  (DB) 
-0.22              (0.29) 
Corruption  Investor Protection Index  (DB) 
0.26                (0.20) 
Access to Finance  Depth of Credit Info Index  (DB)  
0.27                (0.19) 
Economic Instability  Investor Protection Index (DB) 
-0.15               (0.45) 
Tax Administration  Number of Tax Payments  (DB) 
-0.13               (0.54) 
Tax Administration  Time to Pay Taxes  (DB) 
0.32                 (0.12) 
Customs and Trade  Trading Cost for Exports (DB) 
0.22                 (0.29) 
Customs and Trade  Trading Cost for Imports  (DB) 
0.16                (0.42) 
Access to Land  Property Registration, days  (DB) 
0.06                (0.78) 
Note: Figures in parentheses represent levels of confidence 
 
 
One recognized caution over using access to finance as an indicator of the quality of the 
business climate is that access is endogenous.  Weaker and usually smaller firms are most   18
likely to complain (Carlin et al, 2006).  While this effect may influence the responses of 
individual firms, the strength of the cross-country relationship lends support to the view 
of finance as an economy-wide constraint.  Deeper financial markets facilitate access by 
firms that would be unable to access credit in shallower financial markets.  Moreover, the 
results suggest that firms cannot compensate in a simple and low-cost way for inadequate 
financial markets or power grids.  We return to this question later.  
 
Correlations with the Doing Business indicators, however, are not strong.  The Doing 
Business measure of the time needed to get a business license is aligned with the 
corresponding perceptions of firms, but other measures are not significantly correlated 
with firm perceptions.  The low correlations are likely for two reasons.  First, the 
indicators focus on very detailed regulatory areas and capture particular components of 
regulation .  Second, compliance rates may be low at the low levels of income of most 
African countries because rules are not generally enforced.  In their analysis of the ease 
of starting a business, Kaufmann et al point out that “the magnitude and significance of 
the objective measure is in general, smaller in the developing country sample, and larger 
in the industrial country sample…these results suggest that firm perceptions of the ease 
of starting a business depend both on de jure rules, as well as the institutional 
environment in which those rules are applied” (Kaufmann et al, p. 31).   
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IV  Firm-Level Analysis  
 
4.1  A Model of Firm Responses. 
 
We now consider the determinants of responses at firm level, and whether these relate to 
more “objective” measures of the business climate.  The probability that a particular firm 
considers a particular constraint to be severe could be expected to depend on a number of 
factors.  Some constraints might impact differently on large versus small firms, on 
exporting firms versus those selling locally, on foreign-owned versus domestic firms, or 
on firms in different sectors.  Perceptions are also likely to reflect individual experience, 
for example, of power outages, of costs of security, or of the need to pay bribes.  Also, as 
noted above, ratings are likely to reflect a mixture of relative and absolute perceptions of 
severity.   
 
A rating in one area is therefore likely to depend on ratings in other areas.  In particular, 
the perceived severity of constraints “external” to the firm is likely to be inversely related 
to the severity of “internal”, firm-specific, constraints reflecting limited capabilities.  The 
distinction is conceptually clear but may be blurred in practice.  For example, the costs 
imposed by crime may impact on all firms similarly, but a reported constraint in 
accessing credit could partly reflect firm-specific factors, such as limited collateral, a 
weak order book, or incapacity or unwillingness to produce adequate business plans and 
audited financial statements.  Many studies have found the level of education of 
entrepreneurs to be a significant determinant of SME performance.  We would expect 
internal constraints to be more serious for smaller firms less able to access the range of 
skills and technology available to their larger counterparts.  In Africa, many larger firms 
are owned by expatriates or networked ethnic groups able to increase access to a range of 
inputs and skills (Biggs and Shah, 2005, Ramachandran and Shah, 2007).  
 
To more systematically frame the determinants of firm perceptions, we construct a simple 
model.  Profits reflect revenues less costs; they can also fall below potential profits 
because of business-climate related losses, such as those due to power outages and theft.   20
5  Costs and losses are assumed to reflect a mix of external and internal constraints faced 
by the firm.  A profit-maximizing manager will rate each constraint based on how it is 
expected to impact on the profit function.  Firm-specific determinants of the rating c
include characteristics such as size, ownership and export status, as well as the 
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Larger firms have greater internal capabilities; they typically contract at greater distance
for inputs and sales, and therefore are more dependent on well-working transport and 
logistics systems; they will also be more visible to those implementing labor and other
regulations.  Conversely, we might expect small firms to be more concerned about 
 
5 For estimates of losses due to power outages and their impact on total factor productivity see Eifert, Gelb 
and Ramachandran, 2005.   
6 It is worth noting that a manager’s perceptions may be driven by the expected cost rather than the actual 
cost.  For example, the perception of crime may be driven by events in the neighborhood rather than the 
individual’s own experience.  We still expect that this perception will be related to a quantitative measure 
i.e. in this case, it would be the expenditures on security systems, guards etc.   21
constraints that reflect scale economies in providing services and weaker internal 
capabilities, such as access to finance.  Certain aspects of the investment climate, s
finance, are likely to affect domestic firms more, whereas foreign firms are likely to 
complain about customs regulations or other regulatory barriers.  Exporting firms ma
have particular concerns, such as macroeconomic instability, as evidenced by large 




urveys include a number of “objective” variables that reflect firms’ experience of some 
 
any other drivers of perceptions are not captured in the model, such as popular opinion 
d 
s 
                                                
S
of the constraint areas.  For electricity supply, these include days and sales lost to power 
outages; for corruption, informal payments as a percentage of sales; for crime, theft and 
disorder, the cost of security as a percentage of sales (the cost includes wages to security
guards, alarm systems etc), for tax administration, days lost due to inspectors’ visits, and 
for customs and trade regulation the number of days to clear exports.  Views on the cost 
of finance can be compared with the interest rate paid by the individual firm, as derived 
from the surveys and whether the firm has a loan or overdraft, while views on access to 
finance can be tested against whether a firm has a loan or overdraft and whether its 
accounts are audited.   
 
M
about the investment climate (whether the media is reporting heavily about corruption) or 
whether firms feel able to speak freely to evaluators about sensitive areas.   To the extent 
that all firms within a country are influenced uniformly by this type of event or if firms in 
some sectors are influenced more than others, the country or sector dummies will capture 
these effects.  However, if individual firms across sectors are influenced unevenly, or if 
perceptions are driven by the moods of individual managers, the effect would be capture
in the residual.
7  As a first approximation, we assume that the firm-specific indicators 
pick up the main factors causing responses to different constraints to be related, and thu
that error terms are independent across equations.   
 
 
7 Firm-specific effects (such as unobservables related to managerial quality) can be measured only with 
panel data, which we do not yet have for our sample of countries. 
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Probit regressions are run for the countries in our sample,.  The dependent variable is a 
e 
ows 
0/1 dummy, set to 1 if the firm ranks a constraint as major or severe.  Consistent with th
previous breakdown, Table 3a clusters countries into three groups, with the middle 
income countries as the default group and “other” as the default sector.  Table 3b sh
results with individual country dummies (the default being Botswana).   
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 Table 3a:  Probit Estimation of Firm Perceptions, with Country Groups 
Note: Sector dummies are included but not reported in Tables 3a and 3b. 
   Electricity 
Labor 




Finance  Acc Land  Tax admin 
Skilled 
Labor  Custrade 
 
 




      (0.10)     (0.10)     (0.09)    (0.12)  (0.09)    (0.09)  (0.10)  (0.09)  (0.20) 
Size      0.01  0.11***  0.05***    -0.02      -0.14***  -0.08***  0.02  0.13***  0.03 
      (0.02)     (0.02)     (0.01)    (0.02)  (0.02)     (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.03) 
Exportd      0.02      0.06     0.04    -0.02   -0.02     -0.07  0.11*  0.005  -0.07 
      (0.06)     (0.06)     (0.05)    (0.06)  (0.06)      (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.09) 
Fgnown      -0.02     -0.02      0.07  -0.17**       -0.14***      -0.09  -0.03  -0.04  0.05 
      (0.06)     (0.06)      (0.05)     (0.07)  (0.05) (0.06) (0.06)  (0.05)  (0.09) 
days lost    0.004***    ---    ---  ---  ---    --- 
   (0.0003)    ---    ---  ---  ---    --- 
Maj. Union  ---  0.016**  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---    --- 
   ---     (0.06)  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---    --- 
Bribe  pmt  --- ---  0.25***  --- --- --- ---   --- 
   ---  ---     (0.04)  ---  ---  ---  ---    --- 
Overdraft ---  ---  ---  0.23***  ---  ---  ---    --- 
   ---  ---  ---    (0.06)  ---  ---  ---    --- 
Audit  ---  ---  ---     0.07     -0.14***  ---  ---    --- 
   ---  ---  ---    (0.06)       (0.05)  ---  ---    --- 
Ownland  --- ---  --- --- ---  -0.38***  ---   --- 
   ---  ---  ---  ---  ---    (0.05)  ---    --- 
Daytax    --- ---  --- --- --- ---  0.01***    --- 
   ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---    (0.002)    --- 
Training               0.11**   
               (0.05)   
Exp clear  ---  --  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---    0.01*** 
   ---  --  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---       (0.005) 




      (0.07)     (0.06)     (0.05)    (0.07)     (0.06)   (0.06)     (0.07)  (0.05)     (0.11) 
low middle 
income 1.07***  -0.04  0.72***  1.35***  0.71***  0.50***  1.08*** 
 
 
-0.09  0.49*** 
      (0.07)  (0.06)     (0.06)  (0.07)     (0.06)   (0.07)     (0.07)  (0.06)     (0.11) 
N  4061  4599     4583  2926     4377  4441      3989  4898     1016 
Log 
likelihood  -2354.2 -1852.4  -2867.6  -1812.2 -2784.1  -2321.4  -2356.7 
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Table 3b: Probit Estimations with Country Fixed Effects 
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N  4061 4599 4583 2926 4377 4441 3989 4606 1016 
Log  Likelihood  -2157.1 -1733.0 -2581.9 -1676.6 -2696.7 -2209.5 -2126.1 -2450.2 -587.2   25
From the tables above, we see that firm characteristics drive perceptions of some 
constraints but not others.  Firm size does not particularly drive the severity of concern 
about electricity; across the board in low-income and low-middle income Africa firms 
complain about the severity of this constraint.   Sector dummies (suppressed in the tables 
above) do not show any major difference across sectors in firm complaints. 
 
Governance, as measured by concern about corruption, is of more concern to larger firms, 
perhaps due to their visibility and need to make informal payments to ease the burden of 
regulation.  Tax administration is seen as more serious problems by exporting firms, 
suggesting that the ad hoc nature of enforcement means that such firms often find 
themselves vulnerable (Emery, 2003).  Large firms also complain more about labor 
regulations and skill shortages;  the coefficients on size are both positive and significant 
at the 1 percent level of confidence.  Domestic and small firms complain significantly 
more about the access to finance and its cost than do large firms and foreign firms.  
Smaller firms also complain more about access to land. These results are robust to 
variations in econometric specification. The pattern and and significance of the country 
dummies reinforces the patters described in Figures 2a-2c. 
 
These results suggest that smaller African firms tend to work within more restricted 
markets.  They may be less visible to regulators and less appealing targets for predatory 
officials.  They may also require fewer licenses and use less technologically sophisticated 
production processes that demand fewer skilled workers.  They will therefore not be as 
strongly affected by some investment climate problems, but will face additional internal 
constraints – a shortage of management, technical and accounting skills or insufficient 
collateral.  The investment climate may pose an increasing challenge to firms as they 
seek to become larger and more capable.  A firm looking to expand will need to weigh 
potential revenues against the higher costs that include the greater exposure to regulatory 
predation that comes with increased size and visibility and severe skill shortages.   
 
In every regression, the coefficients on the experience dummies are of the correct sign, 
even though a number of other influences, including size, export and ownership status,   26
sector, country group and country fixed effects are taken into account.   In all cases but 
two they are also significant.  The exceptions in Table 3b are majority membership in 
trade unions and whether the firm has audited accounts.  In these two cases the inclusion 
of country fixed effects dilutes the firm experience effects. 
8  Days lost due to power 
outages is a significant determinant of the ranking of electricity as a major or severe 
constraint.  Another regression, not reported here, shows that sales lost is also significant.  
Similarly, the rate of unionization drives perceptions of labor regulations, bribes paid 
affect perceptions about corruption, days to clear exports are tied to complaints about 
customs etc.  None of these results are surprising—for example, firms with access to 
overdrafts are more likely to view high interest rates as a constraint.  The results on 
access to finance are also interesting.  After netting out for fixed effects (which include 
the size factor), having accounts audited substantially decreases the probability that a 
firm considers access to finance as a serious constraint.  This suggests the importance of 
including measures to increase access to accounting and auditing services in programs to 
widen financial access.   
 
It is worth reflecting on why the experience variables are significant at all when the fixed 
effects are included in regressions.
9  If firms are responding to country-level differences 
in, say, security or power supply, differences should simply appear as fixed effects at the 
                                                 
8 Some might argue that the “experience” variables are also subjective in that they record firm responses 
rather than a measurement of the actual event.  While it is indeed true that surveys ask the firm how many 
outages it suffers rather than observing the outages directly, it is also unreasonable to argue that firms  
systematically exaggerate or under-report these events.  The only experience variable for which this might 
be plausible is bribe payments but even in this case, the wording of the question  (“in your industry, what is 
the typical payment”) has, in our opinion, resulted in a higher level of accuracy in the reporting of 
payments.  These results reinforce the correlations with external indicators of the investment climate (that 
is, from data outside of our surveys) to validate firm perceptions. 
 
9  Recent research by Mengistae and others  uses city level means of IC indicators rather than individual 
observations thereof in the context of performance (i.e. productivity) regressions as a way of mitigating 
bias due to reverse causality (Mengistae, 2007).  This is because they are concerned with measuring the 
impact of IC on productivity rather than the other way round. The problem of reverse causality is not as 
important here since we are relating subjective ratings with objective indicators and firm characteristics. In  
the relationship between firm characteristics and IC ratings,  we are using the former as controls rather than 
variables of primary interest. That would seem to leave measurement error  or omitted variables as sources 
of bias in the estimates and for this reason we  include country fixed effects.   For most African countries it 
is not useful, given the small size of the industrial sector, to use city averages.  We  are grateful to Taye 
Mengistae for discussion of this issue.
 
  
   27
level of country/income groups.  The fact that Tables 3a and 3b show many significant 
coefficients suggests high levels of arbitrariness and dispersion in the investment climates 
of Africa, so that some firms suffer from much greater power outages or slow customs 
clearances more than others.  This may be because such public services are delivered on 
an ad hoc basis, or because certain individual firms are more vulnerable to predation 
while others have formed political relationships to improve service delivery.   
 
4.2  Camels and Hippos? 
 
Before concluding, it is worth considering the question of “camels and hippos” raised by 
Hausmann and Velasco, 2005.  If you are in the desert and interview camels about the 
investment climate, the argument goes, you would get a very different idea about what 
the main problems are of living/working in a desert (probably heavy loads or mean camel 
riders) than if you could interview hippos who don't live there.  Hausmann argues that the 
really interesting thing to look at is therefore the underlying industrial structure (that is,  
the camel to hippo ratio) from which you can infer what the real problem is (no water).
10 
 
It is certainly true that the mix of firms surveyed will reflect a degree of self-selection, 
whether for regulatory/governance issues or other country characteristics.  One would not 
expect to find many hi-tech computer firms in Burundi, or a vibrant shipbuilding industry 
in Botswana.
11  However, there are also several indications from our results that suggest 
that in practice, these sorting effects do not dominate the firms’ responses: 
 
--Within countries, responses are relatively uniform across types of firm, 
including foreign-owned firms which are presumably able to compare across countries. 
Deviations in the firms' responses are appreciable only where expected (for example, 
                                                 
10 We are grateful to George Clarke for discussions on this subject. 
11 The approach taken by the World Economic Forum to construct their annual competitiveness report  
adjusts for country differences by weighting different constraints differently at different levels of 
development.  The proposition that firms self-select is also implicit in theories of  comparative advantage, 
which can be  shaped by costs of non-tradedgoods and services as well as factor proportions.  In extreme 
cases, the economy will consist of only subsistence farming and offshore oil rigs or, as in rural Niger, 
cattle. 
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foreign firms are less constrained by finance). 
 
--Cross-country, the intensity of complaints correlates with other country indicators.  For 
example, complaints about finance are far more prevalent in countries with low financial 
depth.  On the camels and hippos argument, firms in countries with low financial depth 
should be self-selected, and not see this as a particularly severe constraint. 
 
Perhaps the most convincing evidence is generated by looking at firms that have adjusted 
to a constraint.  Firms are not passive in the face of constraints.  Where possible they will 
adjust to them, and the question arises whether the ability to adjust means that the 
constraint is no longer recognized as serious.  To answer this question, we take one 
example—whether perceptions about the electric power constraint are affected by 
ownership of a generator (Figure 4).  The results show that firms do not identify absent or 
unreliable power as less constraining when they own a generator.  Firms with generators 
actually complain slightly more about electricity in many countries; this may reflect the 
fact that these tend to be more dependent on electricity and generator power costs some 
three times more than power from the grid.   
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Figure 4: Perceptions on the severity of the electricity constraint, disaggregated by 
generator ownership 
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Evidence on the absence of an effect of generator ownership on the perception of 
whether power is a severe constraint suggests that firms recognize a constraint 
even when they can adapt to it.  Indeed, the camels/hippos argument can be turned 
around.  If the self-selection process for firms is incomplete (as suggested by the above), 
the constraints identified by those present will likely be seen as even more serious by 
those firms that have not chosen to enter.  Alleviating Uganda's power constraint could 
thus bring in a multiple of new business as well as improving conditions for established 
firms.  If in deserts even camels would like to have more water (as we suspect they 
generally would) , this suggests that a host of other animals will come in if the water 
constraint is alleviated. 
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V   Conclusion 
 
Just as household perceptions of well-being may not correlate perfectly with objective 
measures of income or consumption, so firms’ perceptions of critical investment climate 
constraints may not always correspond fully to “objective” reality.  Nevertheless, this 
analysis of the patterns of firm’s responses across African countries suggests that they do 
not complain indiscriminately but exercise judgment and choice in indicating a number of 
constraints as serious.  Response patterns correlate reasonably well with several other 
country-level indicators related to the investment climate.  Responses at the firm level 
also reflect the experience of firms, for example, of the problems posed by erratic power 
supply, or the costs of bribes or security.    Firms can sometimes mitigate investment 
climate problems.  For example, faced with unreliable grid power, they can purchase 
generators.  But mitigation is costly and does not mean that they cease to recognize the 
severity of the problem. 
 
Firms in most African countries tend to see many areas of the investment climate as 
serious constraints to business.  Some constraints seem to be independent of scale, but 
larger firms complain more frequently about many constraints.  These may discourage 
firm’s growth and their progression towards greater visibility, more sophisticated 
technology and wider market reach in terms of both inputs and sales.  Finance and access 
to land are particular areas of concern to smaller firms, while firms across the board are 
concerned about infrastructure and corruption.  Notwithstanding these differences, firm-
effects appear to be less powerful than country-effects in shaping the pattern of 
responses.  Almost all firms in South Africa are better off than almost any firm in low-
income Africa, for almost all of the constraints examined in this paper.  The only 
exceptions are labor regulations and the availability of skilled labor, which appear to 
become more binding constraints as economies become more sophisticated and the 
capacity of the government to enforce regulations increases.    
 
What do these results tell us about “binding constraints” to business?  Contrary to the 
suggestion of Hausmann and Rodrik that a single or few binding constraints can be   31
identified for any given country, we find that firms tend more to identify groups of 
constraints as posing serious problems.  At least in Africa, there may be systematic 
relationships between countries’ level of development or income and the types of 
constraints most often seen as binding. 
 
At the lowest level, the most serious constraints as seen by the firms tend to be those 
closely related to the ability to plan work and produce at all—macroeconomic stability, 
electric power, and finance.  Concerns in these areas decline as income rises, to be 
replaced by a second set of constraints.  These new constraints relate to the quality of 
governance and the capability of the state to provide important services.  Concerns 
include corruption, the level of taxation and quality of tax administration, and security.  
These in turn ease as countries move to middle-income status and governments develop 
greater capacity and regulatory competence.  But this opens the way to a third set of 
obstacles—business will not be the only political constituency.  Organized labor may be 
powerful in some countries.  In others, business might feel constrained by environmental 
regulations.  Moreover, in these countries the state has a stronger capacity to implement 
regulation, so that policies in these areas may have more impact on business than they 
would in many low-income countries.  
 
Individually binding constraints are therefore more likely at the two ends of the income 
spectrum.  At the low end, easing some specific infrastructural constraint—such as 
electric power in East Africa—may have a huge payoff in business opportunities.  At the 
higher end, surveys may distinguish a few policy areas of particular concern to business.  
Things are more difficult in the middle of the spectrum, where weak governance and low 
state capacity cause firms to experience a wide range of business climate impediments.   
 
But even in cases where particular constraints emerge as serious, there is no magic bullet.  
Efforts to improve the business climate need to be implemented across a broad front, with 
physical investments in infrastructure complemented by regulatory reforms and also by 
the careful monitoring of service delivery to increase pressure for actual changes on the 
ground.  Firms’ views can help to prioritize reforms across broad areas.  Finer   32
prioritization requires analysis of the specific concerns in each priority area, including 
through Doing Business–type indicators.  In this way, perceptions data can kick off the 
business-government consultative process; while further quantitative assessments can 
deepen this dialogue and lead to specific reforms.  
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